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February 1, 2018 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW PREEMPTION 
Richard Briffault
*
 
 
I. Introduction 
The past decade has witnessed the emergence and rapid spread of a new and aggressive 
form of state preemption of local government action. Traditionally, preemption consisted of a 
judicial determination of whether a new local law is inconsistent with pre-existing state law. 
Classic preemption analysis harmonized the efforts of different levels of government in areas in 
which both enjoy regulatory authority and determined the degree to which state policies could 
coexist with local additions or variations. Such “old preemption” disputes continue to arise, of 
course, but the real action today is the “new preemption” – new sweeping state laws that clearly, 
intentionally, extensively, and at times punitively bar local efforts to address a host of local 
problems.  
The “new preemption” runs the gamut of legislative subjects, from hot-button social 
issues like firearms regulation, sanctuary cities, and the rights of transgender individuals; to 
workplace disputes over wages, leave policies, and scheduling, to ostensibly more prosaic 
subjects like plastic bags, menu labeling, residential sprinkler systems, and puppy mills. New 
preemption measures frequently displace local action without replacing it with substantive state 
requirements. Often propelled by trade association and business lobbying,
1
 preemptive state laws 
are aimed not at coordinating state and local regulation but preventing any regulation at all.  
Several state legislatures have gone further, adopting punitive preemption laws that do 
not merely nullify inconsistent local rules – the traditional effect of preemption – but impose 
                                                          
*
 Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia University School of Law. This paper benefited from 
comments on a preliminary draft provided by the participants at the 6th Annual State and Local Government 
Works-in-Progress Conference at Golden Gate University School of Law. Since 2017, I have been a consultant to 
the Rockefeller Family Fund and organizations it supports addressing preemption issues. The views expressed in 
this paper are entirely my own.  
1
 See, e.g., Henry Grabar, The Shackling of the American City, Slate, Sept. 9, 2016, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/metropolis/2016/09/how_alec_acce_and_pre_emptions_laws_are_guttin
g_the_powers_of_american_cities.html; Mary Bottari, The ALEC-Backed War on Local Democracy, Huffington Post, 
Dec. 6, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-bottari/the-alec-backed-war-on-lo_b_6961142.html.  
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harsh penalties on local officials or governments simply for having such measures on their 
books. Others have considered proposals that are tantamount to nuclear preemption, effectively 
blowing up the ability of local governments to regulate without affirmative state authorization. 
The rise of the new preemption is closely connected to the interacting polarizations of 
Republican and Democrat, conservative and liberal, and non-urban and urban. To be sure, 
Democratic states preempt Democratic cities;
2
 preemptive laws constrain small towns;
3
 and 
some measures impose progressive values on conservative communities.
4
 But the preponderance 
of deregulatory, punitive, and nuclear preemptive actions and proposals have been advanced by 
Republican-dominated state governments, embrace conservative economic and social causes, 
and respond to – and are designed to block -- relatively progressive regulatory actions adopted 
by activist cities and counties. Since 2011, Republicans have dominated state governments. In 
2013 Republicans controlled both houses of twenty-six state legislatures, and had trifectas – 
control of the legislature and the governorship – in twenty-four states.5 By the start of 2017, the 
number of Republican legislatures and trifectas had risen to thirty-two and twenty-six, 
respectively.
6
 This Republican dominance includes so-called purple states – such as Florida, 
                                                          
2
 See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Cuomo Blocks New York City Plastic Bag Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/nyregion/cuomo-blocks-new-york-city-plastic-bag-law.html; Sam Adler-
Bell, Why Are Rhode Island Democrats Blocking Minimum-Wage Increases?, The Nation, June 11, 2014, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/why-are-rhode-island-democrats-blocking-minimum-wage-increases/.   
3
 See, e.g., “AG Brnovich Finds Bisbee’s Plastic Bag Ban Violates State Law, Oct. 24, 2017, 
https://www.azag.gov/press-release/ag-brnovich-finds-bisbees-plastic-bag-ban-violates-state-law. (state challenge 
to plastic bag ban of Bisbee, pop. 5,538); Alan Greenblatt, Arkansas Cities Pass LGBT Protections That Defy State’s 
New Discrimination Law, Governing, May 11, 2015, http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-arkansas-
discrimination-gay.html (noting Arkansas’s preemption of local anti-discrimination measures was triggered in part 
by law passed by Eureka Springs, population, 2,074.)  
4
 See, e.g., Monique Garcia and Kim Geiger, Rauner narrowly beats back union push to ban right-to-work zones, 
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 8, 2017, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-met-bruce-rauner-right-to-
work-override-20171107-story.html (Governor’s veto of state legislation, triggered by action of suburban village of 
Lincolnshire, to prevent local governments from adopting right-to-work ordinances which bar employers from 
requiring employees to pay agency fees to union collective bargaining representatives); cf. Cal. Labor Code, § 1782 
(denying state construction funds to charter cities that permit contractors not to pay prevailing wage on city 
construction projects); Governing, Michigan’s High Court Rules Localities Can’t Ban Medical Marijuana, Feb. 7, 
2014, http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/Michigans-High-Court-Rules-Localities-Cant-Ban-Medical-
Marijuana.html?no_redirect=true (state marijuana legalization preempts local anti-marijuana zoning ordinances). 
5
 See Wikipedia, United States state legislatures’ partisan trend, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_state_legislatures%27_partisan_trend. 
6
 See Wikipedia, List of United States state legislatures, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_state_legislatures. This count does not include Nebraska’s 
unicameral and nominally nonpartisan legislature, which is dominated by Republican-affiliated members; Nebraska 
also has a Republican governor. 
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Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin – where Democrats compete effectively in 
presidential or United States Senate contests but in the last decade have been swamped in state 
elections.
7
 Even as a majority of states are controlled by Republicans, most cities, particularly 
big cities, are led by Democrats. Thirty-two of the fifty largest cities have Democratic mayors; 
fifteen of those are in Republican trifecta states, including Houston, Dallas, and Austin in Texas; 
Jacksonville and Miami, Florida; Phoenix and Tucson in Arizona; Columbus, Ohio; Charlotte, 
North Carolina; Detroit, Michigan; Memphis and Nashville, Tennessee; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
Kansas City, Missouri; and Atlanta, Georgia.
8
 The not-so-irresistible force of cities pushing 
progressive agendas in environmental regulation, public health, anti-discrimination, and 
workplace equity increasingly runs into the immovable object of conservative state resistance, 
manifested by aggressive preemption.
9
  
This Article examines the rise of the new preemption and the challenges it raises for 
lawyers and scholars.
10
 Part II provides an overview of the range of preemptive measures, 
focusing on a handful of the most sweeping and punitive state laws. Part III turns to the difficult 
challenge for local governments of developing legal defenses against preemption. Existing 
federal and state legal doctrines provide local governments with few protections against 
intentional state efforts to curtail their powers. Although I will point to some doctrinal arguments 
that can be raised against the most punitive and deregulatory forms of the new preemption, the 
                                                          
7
 See, e.g., Brief of International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n, et al, in Gill v. Whitford, U.S. S Ct., Np. 16-1161, Sept. 5, 
2017. In 2017, four of those five states – all but North Carolina – were Republican trifecta states. North Carolina 
had been a Republican trifecta states in 2016, when it adopted HB 2, the so-called “Bathroom Bill,” a poster child 
of the new preemption.  
8
 See Wikipedia, List of mayors of the 50 largest cities in the United States, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mayors_of_the_50_largest_cities_in_the_United_States. Adding the next 
fifty cities, 67 of the one hundred largest cities have Democratic mayors, including, in Republican trifecta states, 
Wichita, Kansas; Boise, Idaho; and Birmingham, Alabama. Professor Diller notes that 38 of the 51 cities with 
populations greater than 250,000 are more liberal than the national mean. See Paul Diller, Reorienting Home Rule, 
Part 1 – The Urban Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 La. L. Rev. 287, 292-97 (2016). 
9
 See, e.g., Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy Innovation, 47 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 403 (2017); Greenblatt, Beyond North Carolina’s LGBT Battle: States’ War on 
Cities, Governing, March 25, 2016, http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-states-cities-preemption-
laws.html.  
10
 The New Preemption has already become the focus of a considerable critical literature from local government 
law scholars. See, e.g., Erin Scharff, Hyper Preemption? A Reordering of the State Local Relationship? 106 Geo. L.J. 
___ (forthcoming 2018); Richard Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, __ Texas L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 
2018), Kenneth Stahl, Preemption, Federalism and Local Democracy, 44 Ford. Urb. L.J. 133, 134 (2017); Diller, 
supra. 
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legal defense against preemption will require state courts to assume a greater role in defending 
local autonomy than most have traditionally been willing to undertake.   
Part IV makes the case for closer state court scrutiny of preemptive measures, grounded 
in the values of local self-government; the crucial role local governments play in practice in our 
governance structure; and the widespread state constitutional recognition of local autonomy. 
Attention to home rule provides a basis for challenging the more extreme new preemption 
measures that strike directly at the idea of local self-government, although most preemption 
measures may still pass muster. 
Part V concludes by considering whether, in light of the new preemption, local autonomy 
should be seen as a value in itself, or merely as a means to other political ends. Much of the 
criticism of the new preemption has come from advocates of “progressive localism” and has 
focused on how conservative state lawmakers are using preemption to block progressive 
initiatives. Should local autonomy be protected irrespective of the purposes to which local power 
is being put? I will suggest a tentative, somewhat hedged, yes. In this highly polarized era, local 
autonomy can reduce conflict by permitting diverse communities to take different approaches to 
difficult problems, while also generating usable information about how debated public policies 
work in practice. Some superior state power is necessary to address the external effects of local 
action and the costs of varying local laws for the well-being of the state as a whole, and to assure 
that the scale of government action is consistent with the scope of economic and social problems. 
But our system ought to maintain some legal space for local self-determination concerning 
problems that arise at the local level. 
II. The New Preemption 
A. An Overview 
The new preemption is broad in scope and wide-ranging in subject matter. Putting aside 
sanctuary city issues, which until very recently were more a matter of federal preemption,
11
 
                                                          
11
 In 2017, thirty-six states considered sanctuary legislation concerning undocumented aliens, with measures both 
supporting and opposing local noncooperation with federal immigration enforcement. Mississippi and Texas both 
passed sweeping anti-sanctuary laws. See Miss. Code Ann 25-1-119; Vernon’s Tex. Code Ann. Gov’t Code 
§§752.051-752.057. Multiple sections of the Texas law were blocked by a preliminary injunction, see City of El 
Cenizo v. State, 264 F.Supp.3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017), with parts of that injunction subsequently stayed pending 
appeal. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 2017 WL 4250186, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir., Sept. 25, 2017). 
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states have barred local actions in areas as diverse as, inter alia, firearms, workplace relations, 
public health and the environment, anti-discrimination, Civil War monuments, the sharing 
economy, and puppy mills.  
Forty-five states prohibit local governments from regulating firearms; most do so by 
statute but in New Mexico the ban is in the state constitution.
12
 Twelve states absolutely ban all 
local firearms regulation;  others permit some restrictions, such as limiting the discharge of guns 
in public places or the carrying of firearms in government buildings.
13
 Many measures predate 
the past decade but states have continued to add new prohibitions.
14
  
Local workplace regulation may be the most significant target of the new preemption, 
triggered by the leadership role many local governments have taken in strengthening worker 
rights.
15
 More than forty cities and counties require at least some employers to pay wages higher 
than the federal or state minimum.
16
 Others require employers to provide paid sick leave or 
family leave,
17
 or to give notice concerning scheduling changes;
18
 some have passed “fair 
chance” laws regulating employer inquiries into the criminal records of prospective employees.19 
The business community has turned to the state legislatures to push back hard against these 
measures.
20
 Twenty-five states now ban local minimum wage requirements above the federal or 
                                                          
12
 Tartakovsky, Firearm Preemption Laws and What They Mean for Cities, 54 Mun. L. 6, 7 (2013). 
13
 Id.  
14
 See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, et al, City Gun Laws Hit Roadblock, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 2013, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324761004578286072929691906.  
15
 Marni von Wilpert, Economic Pol. Inst., City governments are raising standards for working people – and state 
legislators are lowering them back down, Aug. 26, 2017, http://www.epi.org/publication/city-governments-are-
raising-standards-for-working-people-and-state-legislators-are-lowering-them-back-down/.  
16
 Nat’l Emp. L. Proj., Fighting Preemption: The Movement for Higher Wages Must Oppose State Efforts to Block 
Local Minimum Wage Laws, July 2017, http://www.nelp.org/publication/fighting-preemption-local-minimum-
wage-laws/.  
17
 See, e.g., More California Cities, Chicago, Minneapolis, and St. Paul enact paid sick leave laws, Sept. 2016, 
https://www.towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/insider/2016/09/more-cities-enact-paid-
sick-leave-laws; Seattle Finally Has a Plan to Give All Workers Paid Family Leave, Mar. 22, 2017, 
https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2017/03/22/25034563/seattle-finally-has-a-plan-to-give-all-workers-paid-
family-leave; San Francisco and New York Pass New Paid Family Leave Laws, While California Increases Benefits 
Under its Leave Program, http://wsandco.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/EmployeeBenefits-SFNYPaidLeave-
041116.pdf.  
18
 See, e.g., Predictive Scheduling Laws: Coming Soon to a Jurisdiction Near You,  Aug. 4, 2017, 
https://www.hrdive.com/news/predictive-scheduling-laws-coming-soon-to-a-jurisdiction-near-you/448483/ 
(discussing laws in New York City, San Francisco, and Seattle). 
19
 Nat’l Emp. L. Proj., Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, Counties, and States Adopt Fair Hiring Policies, Aug. 1, 2017. 
20
 See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, State Labor Law Reform: Tools for Growth, 2016, at 20-25 (calling for state 
preemption of municipal ordinances mandating higher minimum wage and/or paid sick leave, and preemption of 
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state floor, sixteen  preempt local paid sick leave rules, with most preemptive measures adopted 
since 2013.
21
 Between 2015 and 2017, fifteen states preempted local predictive scheduling 
laws,
22
 and local ban-the-box laws are at risk as well.
23
 Some of these statutes are particularly 
sweeping.  Michigan’s so-called Death Star law24 -- more formally, the Local Government Law 
Regulation Act of 2015
25
 -- bars local governments from adopting, enforcing or administering 
local laws or policies concerning employee background checks, minimum wage, fringe benefits, 
paid or unpaid leave, work stoppages, fair scheduling, apprenticeships, or remedies for 
workplace disputes.
26
 
States have homed in on local environmental and public health rules. Nine preempt local 
nutrition regulations, such as calorie counts and other menu labeling rules; restrictions on  
promotional incentives (toys) with fast-food meals; or efforts to address “food deserts” (poor 
neighborhoods with few stores selling fruits or vegetables).
27
 Mississippi, for example, prohibits 
any local regulation of the “provision or nonprovision of food nutrition information or consumer 
incentive items at food service operations” or of the sale of food and beverages approved for sale 
by federal or state agencies.
28
 This is known colloquially as the “anti-Bloomberg bill” in ironic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
local enforcement efforts against “wage theft,” that is, not paying workers what they are owed), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/wfi_statelaborlawreport.pdf;  American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), Living Wage Mandate Preemption Act (model law, approved 2002, 
reapproved 2013 and 2017), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/living-wage-mandate-preemption-act/.  
21
 See Grassroots Change Preemption Watch, https://grassrootschange.net/preemption-watch/#/category/paid-
sick-days; Claire Zillman, The paid sick leave battle continues, state by state, Fortune, Feb. 11, 2015, 
http://fortune.com/2015/02/11/paid-sick-leave-state-laws-bans.  
22
 Von Wilpert, supra. 
23
 See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. 17-25-33; Gray, Republicans taking bite out of local control, stopping ordinances 
before they start, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 16, 2017 (noting bill that would prohibit local communities from telling 
employers what they can or cannot ask prospective employees during job interviews), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2017/10/16/republicans-taking-bite-out-local-control-stopping-
ordinances-before-they-start/763587001/; SeyfarthShaw, A Ban on Ban-the-Box Laws? Indiana and Texas 
Introduce Legislation That Would Prohibit Municipal and County Ban-the-Box Laws Within their States,  July 21, 
2017, http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/OMM072117-LE (Indiana enacted the measure, effective July 1, 
2017). 
24
 Bruchlawoffices, The Death Star Bill Has Become Law, Aug. 4, 2015, http://bruchlawoffices.com/the-death-star-
bill-has-become-law/.  
25
 M.C.L.A. §§ 123.1381-123.1396. 
26
 See id.  
27
 See Grassroots Preemption Watch, https://grassrootschange.net/preemption-watch/#/category/nutrition. See 
also ALEC, Food and Nutrition Act (model state law approved by ALEC Board, 2012), https://www.alec.org/model-
policy/food-and-nutrition-act/.  
28
 Miss. Code Ann. 75-29-901. 
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recognition of the public health efforts of New York City’s former mayor.29 Other preempted 
public health subjects include pesticides (local regulation preempted in 43 states);
30
 tobacco 
products (31 states bar a range of local measures concerning advertising, smoke-free indoor air, 
or youth access to vending machines);
31
 e-cigarettes (eight states);
32
 factory farms (thirteen 
states);
33
 and fire sprinkler installation in new homes (sixteen states).
34
 
Perhaps the most surprising flash point in the new preemption era has been plastic bags. 
Concerned about the aesthetic, environmental, and clean-up costs of plastic bags, at least a dozen 
major cities and counties have either banned or taxed their use.
35
 Some states, including 
California, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, and Rhode Island have also adopted measures to 
discourage use of plastic bags or promote their recycling, but more recently the state-level action 
has been in the opposite direction, with Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, 
Missouri, and Wisconsin barring local plastic bag regulation. The American City Council 
Exchange (“ACCE”) -- the local government offshoot of the American Legislative Exchange 
(“ALEC”), which has provided the template for many preemption laws -- has strongly embraced 
state preemption of local plastic bag regulation in the name of “business and consumer choice.”36  
                                                          
29
 Holly Yan, No Soda Ban here: Mississippi passes ‘anti-Bloomberg’ bill, CNN, March 12, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/21/us/mississippi-anti-bloomberg-bill/index.html. See also Kans.Stat.Ann. 
§12.16.137. 
30
 See Pesticide Action Network, Reclaiming Local Control, http://www.panna.org/policies-work/reclaiming-local-
control. See also ALEC, State Pesticide Preemption Act (model state law approved by ALEC board in 1995 and 
reapproved in 2013 and 2017), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/state-pesticide-preemption-act/.  
31
 Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Map of Preemption on Advertising, Licensure, Smokefree Indoor Air 
and Youth Access, as of Sept. 30, 2017, https://www.cdc.gov/statesystem/preemption.html. 
32
 Grassroots Change Preemption Watch, https://grassrootschange.net/preemption-watch/#/category/e-
cigarettes.  
33
 Grassroots Change Preemption Watch, https://grassrootschange.net/preemption-watch/#/category/factory-
farms. For critiques of the impact of the New Preemption on public health, see, e.g., Hodge, et al, Public Health 
Preemption Plus: Constitutional Affronts to Public Health Innovation, __ Ohio St. L.J. ___ (2017) (forthcoming); 
Pomerantz & Pertschuk, State Preemption: A Significant and Quiet Threat to Public Health in the United States, 107 
Am. J. Pub. Health 900 (2017). 
34
 Grassroots Change, Preemption Watch, https://grassrootschange.net/preemption-watch/#/category/fire-
prevention.  
35
 See Nat’l Conf. State Legs., State Plastic and Paper Bag Legislation, July 5, 2017, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/plastic-bag-legislation.aspx. See also Angele 
Howe,  Surfrider Foundation, State Preemption: Taking Away “Home Rule” on Plastic Pollution, June 9, 2017, 
https://www.surfrider.org/coastal-blog/entry/state-preemption-taking-away-home-rule-on-plastic-pollution.  
36
 See American City County Exchange, Regulating Containers to Protect Business and Consumer Choice, Model 
Resolution finalized July 24, 2015, last amended Sept. 4, 2015, http://www.acce.us/model-policy/regulating-
containers-to-protect-business-and-consumer-choice/. See also Mize, Big Cities in a Bigger State, 57 So. Tex. L. Rev. 
311, 327 (2016) (noting that one Texas plastic bag ban proposal called itself the “Shopping Bag Freedom Act”). 
 8 
 
Arizona’s attorney general’s enforcement of that state’s plastic bag ban ban (yes, that’s two 
“bans”) against the tiny town of Bisbee caused a storm of controversy, with Bisbee ultimately 
yielding to the state’s force majeure without contesting it in court.37 Other state-local 
environmental conflicts include the hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, technology for extracting 
natural gas, with seven states now expressly banning local fracking regulation,
38
 and state 
preemption of local regulation of polystyrene products (Styrofoam).
39
 
Anti-discrimination laws are another arena for preemption. With at least 225 cities and 
counties in 34 states banning employment discrimination on the basis of sexual preference or 
gender identity,
40
 conservative state legislatures have begun to push back. In 2011, Tennessee 
became the first state to bar local laws extending anti-discrimination protections beyond those 
provided by state law,
41
 with Arkansas following in 2015,
42
 and North Carolina in 2016. The 
nationwide furor over North Carolina’s so-called Bathroom Bill43 -- enacted in response to a 
Charlotte ordinance that extended anti-discrimination protections to gay, lesbian and transgender 
people and allowed transgender people to select the bathroom consistent with their gender 
identity -- appears to have stalled efforts in other states for now,
44
 but the issue is far from 
                                                          
37
 See, e.g., Dustin Gardner, Bisbee must repeal plastic-bag ban or lose funding, AG says, Oct. 24, 2017, 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2017/10/24/bisbee-must-repeal-plastic-grocery-bag-ban-
lose-funding-arizona-ag-says/795970001/; Dustin Gardner, Bisbee repealing plastic-bag ban to dodge state budget 
hit, Oct. 31, 2017, https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2017/10/31/bisbee-plastic-bag-
ordinance-repeal-attorney-general-mark-brnovich-ruling/819584001/.  
38
 See, e.g., Briffault, et al, The Troubling Turn in State Preemption: The Assault on Progressive Cities and How 
Cities Can Respond, ACS Issue Brief, Sept. 2017, https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/ACS_Issue_Brief_-
_Preemption_0.pdf, at 7. See also Briffault & Reynolds, Cases and Materials on State and Local Government Law 
(West Acad. Pub., 8
th
 ed., 2016) at 448-55, 471-74. 
39
 See, e.g., Fl. Stat. Ann § 500.90. See Lance Dixon, Coral Gables sued over plan to keep Styrofoam ban, July 19, 
2016, Miami Herald, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/coral-
gables/article90583302.html.  
40
 Human Rights Campaign, Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances that Include Gender Identity, 
as of Jan. 28, 2017, https://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-counties-with-non-discrimination-ordinances-that-
include-gender.  
41
 Tenn. Code Ann. §4-21-102 (2012). 
42
 Ark. Code Ann. §§ 14-1-402-403. See also Alan Greenblatt, Arkansas Cities Pass LGBT Protections that Defy 
State’s New Discrimination Law, Governing, May 11, 2015, http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-
arkansas-discrimination-gay.html.  
43
 An Act to Provide for Single-Sex Multiple Occupancy Bathroom and Changing Facilities, N.C.G.S. § 143- 
422.11(b) (2016). 
44
 See, e.g., Lauren McGaughy, The Texas Bathroom Bill is Dead – for Now, Aug. 15, 2017, 
www.dallasnews.com/news/texas-legislature/2017/08/15/transgender-texans-cautiously-optimistic-bathroom-
bill-declared-dead-now.; Human Rights Watch, South Dakota Governor Pledges to Veto Anti-Gender Bill,  Jan. 27, 
2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/27/south-dakota-governor-pledges-veto-anti-transgender-bill.  
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dead.
45
 In a similar vein, as urban protests over public memorials to the Confederate side in the 
Civil War have mushroomed, so, too, have state laws barring local government actions to 
remove monuments within their borders.
46
 
Rounding out this overview, seventeen states preempt municipal broadband services,
47
 37  
preempt local regulation of ride-sharing platforms,
48
 three have displaced local regulation of 
home-sharing and short-term rentals;
49
 26 bar local rent control ordinances;
50
 and eleven appear 
to have adopted measures intended to prevent local inclusionary zoning requirements for new 
housing developments.
51
 Some states now also now preempt local efforts to address the plight of 
animals raised in “puppy mills” – “commercial dog breeders infamous for keeping animals in 
poor conditions”52 – by barring local pet shops from selling animals raised in puppy mills.53 
Starting with Albuquerque, New Mexico in 2006, nearly two hundred cities and counties barred 
the sale of puppy mill-bred animals, thereby also encouraging the placement of rescue dogs. In 
2016, however, Arizona and Ohio, preempted such local regulation of pet sales.
54
 
                                                          
45
 See, e.g., Ray Sanchez, First days of 2017 bring new ‘bathroom bills,’ Jan. 7, 2017,  
www.dallasnews.com/news/texas-legislature/2017/08/15/transgender-texans-cautiously-optimistic-bathroom-
bill-declared-dead-now (noting measures introduced or pending in eight states);  
46
 See, e.g., Kaeli Subberwal, Several States Have Erected Laws to Protect Confederate Monuments, Huffington 
Post, Aug, 18, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/states-confederate-statue-
laws_us_5996312be4b0e8cc855cb2ab; Ala Code 41-9-230 (Alabama Memorial Preservation Act of 2017); Tenn. 
Code Ann. 4-1-412 (Tennessee Heritage Protection Act of 2016).  
47
 See, e.g., Nat’l League of Cities, City Rights in an Era of Preemption,: A State-by-State Analysis 17-19, Feb. 22, 
2017, http://www.nlc.org/preemption.  
48
 Id. at 12-13. 
49
 Id. at 15-16. See also Governing, Michigan Lawmakers Putting Limits on Local Authority, Oct. 16, 2017, 
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/Michigan-State-Lawmakers-Putting-Limits-on-Local-Authority.html.  
50
 NLC, supra, at 23. 
51
 See A Better Balance, State Preemption of Local Laws: A Preliminary Review of Substantive Areas, March 2017, 
https://www.abetterbalance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/State-Preemption-of-Local-Laws.pdf.  
52
 Henry Grabar, Cities are Slowly Putting Puppy Mills Out of Business. These States Are Trying to Stop Them, Slate, 
Sept. 9, 2016, 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2016/09/09/cities_are_putting_puppy_mills_out_of_business_by_regulat
ing_pet_stores.html. Cf. Park Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 872 F.3d 495, 500 (7
th
 Cir. 2017) (noting “the social 
problems and economic costs associated with mill-bred pets”).  
53
 Puppy mill animals may have health issues that lead owners to abandon them, with increased costs for local 
animal control and shelter programs. See, e.g., (Proposed) Memorandum of Amicus Curiae City of Tempe, Puppies 
‘N Love v. City of Phoenix, filed June 28, 2017, Case No. CV 14-00073-PHX-DGC (U.S. D. Ct. D. Az.), 
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 See Fischer, Ducey signs ‘puppy mill’ bill over objections of pet advocates, Ariz. Cap. Times., May 19, 2016, 
(state’s action voided existing local laws in Phoenix and Tempe as well as one on hold in Tucson) 
http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2016/05/19/ducey-signs-puppy-mill-bill-over-objections-of-pet-advocates/; 
Provance, Kasich signs weapons, puppy bills, Dec. 20, 2016, The Blade (preempting laws in Toledo and Grove City), 
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B. Punitive Preemption 
Going beyond preemption’s traditional focus on simply negating local laws, some states 
now punish local officials or local governments for having preempted policies.    
(1) Personal Liability. A half-dozen states reinforced preexisting firearms preemption 
laws by threatening local officials with fines, civil liability, or removal from office for enacting 
or enforcing firearms measures.
55
 In 2012, Kentucky created a private right of action for 
individuals and membership organizations affected by local gun ordinances to seek damages and 
litigation fees from local officials, and actually made it a crime – official misconduct in either the 
first or second degree, depending on the circumstances – for a local official to violate the state 
gun preemption law “or the spirit thereof.”56 Florida has not criminalized preemption violations 
but it imposes civil penalties on any person who violates its gun preemption law by “enacting or 
causing to be enforced any local ordinance or administrative rule or regulation impinging upon 
[the state’s] exclusive occupation of the field.”57 The penalties for “knowing and willful 
violations include civil fines on individual officials up to $5000,
58
 and removal from office by 
the Governor.
59
 Individuals or groups “whose membership is adversely affected by any 
ordinance, regulation, measure, directive, rule, enactment, order, or policy promulgated or 
caused to be enforced in violation” of the gun preemption law may also sue the local government 
for declaratory and injunctive relief and up to $100,000 in damages.
60
  
Florida’s law has twice been the subject of litigation. In Marcus v. Scott,61 a Florida court 
held that it would be unconstitutional to apply the removal provision to county commissioners 
because a specific provision of the Florida constitution authorizes the governor only to suspend 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.toledoblade.com/State/2016/12/20/John-Kasich-signs-weapons-puppy-bills-Toledo-pet-store-
regulations-overridden.html.  
55
 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-3108 (removal from office); Miss. Code Ann. § 45-9- 53(5) (local officials subject to 
civil liability, including money damages and attorneys’ fees; public funds may not be used to indemnify officials for 
legal costs or penalties); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.24(D) (same). See also Tartakovsky, supra, at 7.  
56
 Ky. Rev. Stat. 65.870(5). 
57
 Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3)(a). 
58
 Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3)(c). As with other punitive measures, public officials sued under this provision may not have 
their legal costs or fines covered by public funds. Id. at § 790.33(d). 
59
 Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3)(e). 
60
 Fla. Stat. § 790.33(3)(f), 
61
 2014 WL 3797314 (Fl. Cir. Ct. June 2. 2014) 
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commissioners, with the removal power vested in the state senate.
62
 The court, however, was 
careful to limit its decision to the special case of the county officials mentioned in the 
constitution; it did not address the legislature’s authority to require the removal of other local 
officers who violate the preemption law. In Florida Carry, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee,
63
 gun 
rights organizations sued the city and individual members of the city commission, including the 
mayor for failing to repeal two unenforced city gun ordinances dating back to 1957 and 1984, 
dealing with the discharge of firearms in small lots and in city parks. The ordinances had been 
preempted by a 1987 state law, and the city’s police chief had specifically directed police 
personnel not to enforce them.  
The gun rights groups, however, wanted the ordinances formally stricken from the city’s books. 
The Tallahassee City Commission took up the matter but voted to indefinitely table discussion of 
repeal. The gun groups then sued under the punitive preemption statute. The court concluded that 
neither the tabling of the discussion of repeal nor the continued publication of the preempted 
ordinances in the city’s code constituted “promulgat[ion]” within the meaning of the preemption 
statute, and that, given the lack of enforcement of the measures, the city and city officials were 
entitled to summary judgement.
64
 The court, however, declined to rule on the city officials’ 
argument that punitive preemption violated principles of local legislative immunity and free 
speech, finding that as no penalties had been imposed there was no need to address the issue.
65
 
In 2017, Texas included punitive provisions in its anti-sanctuary city law, providing, inter 
alia, for the removal from office of any local official who adopts, enforces, or endorses any local 
policy that prohibits or materially interferes with the enforcement of immigration laws.
66
 A 
pending Florida anti-sanctuary also bill provides for suspension or removal from office for any 
local official who “willfully or knowingly fails to report a known or probable violation” of the 
law’s requirements.67 
(2) Fiscal Sanctions Against Local Governments Arizona’s firearm preemption law 
subjects non-compliant local governments to fines of up to $50,000 for knowing and willful 
                                                          
62
 Id. at *3-*4. 
63
 212 So.3d 452 (Fla. App., Dist. 1, 2017) 
64
 Id. at 459-465. 
65
 Id. at 465-66. 
66
 Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.0565. 
67
 Fla. H.B. 9 (2018), at proposed new section 908.206. 
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violations.
68
 The Texas anti-sanctuary city law makes local governments civilly liable, with 
penalties of up to $1500 for a first violation and $25,500 for subsequent violations, with each day 
of a continuing violation constituting a separate violation.
69
 Texas Governor Abbott has withheld 
from sanctuary jurisdictions previously awarded and allocated grant funds for programs that 
were designed for victims of family violence, veterans and other at-risk communities, and has 
refused grant applications from Travis County (Austin), including those unrelated to immigration 
matters, because of its sanctuary policy.
70
 The proposed Florida anti-sanctuary city law would 
make non-compliant communities liable for fines of  between $1000 and $5000 per day; 
ineligible for state grant funding for five years; and subject to a civil cause of action for injuries 
or wrongful death sustained by victims of crimes committed by undocumented aliens on a 
finding that a locality’s non-compliance with the law’s requirements gave the alien access to the 
victim.
71
 
The most punitive
72
 fiscal measure is surely Arizona’s SB 1487,73 which is not limited to 
a specific subject like firearms or sanctuary but authorizes the imposition of fiscal penalties 
across the board. The law provides that any state legislator may request the state attorney general 
– who must act within thirty days -- to investigate and report a claim that a local official action 
violates state law. On finding a violation, the attorney general must notify the offending local 
government and, if it “fail[s] to resolve the violation” within thirty days, the attorney general 
must notify the state treasurer “who shall withhold and redistribute [to other localities] state 
shared monies” until the violation is resolved. If the attorney general concludes merely that the 
local measure “may violate” state law, the attorney general must immediately bring a special 
action in the state supreme court to determine the issue. However, in order to contest the action, 
the defendant local government must “post a bond” equal to the state shared revenue it received 
in the past six months – arguably a harsher penalty than the future loss or revenues, and one 
                                                          
68
 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-3108(I). 
69
 See Tex. Gov’t Code, § 752.056. 
70
 El Cenizo, supra, 264 F.Supp.3d at 790-91. 
71
 See Fl. HB 9 (2018), supra. 
72
 Less dramatic but still coercive if not punitive are the California law -- adopted in the aftermath of a state 
supreme court decision exempting charter city construction contracts from the state’s prevailing wage law -- 
denying state construction funds to any charter city which, in the preceding two years, awarded a public works 
contract without requiring the contractor to comply with the state prevailing wage law, Cal. Lab. Code § 1782 (2);  
and the 2017 Michigan law cutting off from any local district that sues the state an amount of state aid equal to 
the district’s litigation expenses, see Mich. Comp. L. A. §388.1764g. 
73
 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 41-194.01. 
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virtually none of the state’s localities would be able to meet.74 “State shared monies” constitute 
roughly one-third of  local revenues in Arizona; moreover, the state revenue sharing system was 
adopted in the 1970s as part of a package in which the state constitution was amended to bar a 
local income tax. As a result the state funds affected by SB 1487 are crucial to local fiscal health, 
and withholding funds would be an effective means of bludgeoning a recalcitrant locality into 
submission.
75
  
In the first eighteen months after its enactment, S.B. 1487 resulted in seven investigations 
into local practices or laws, concerning such subjects as firearms, medical marijuana, policing, 
truck regulation, and a plastic bag ban, with findings of violations in two cases (firearms and the 
plastic bag ban), and a “may violate” subsequently resolved by negotiation in a third.76 The most 
significant case involved Tucson’s ordinance, adopted in 2005, providing for the destruction of 
firearms the city had obtained through forfeiture or as unclaimed property. On the complaint of a 
state legislator from outside Tucson, the attorney general concluded the ordinance was 
preempted by a state law, enacted in 2013, directing that such firearms be sold. The city 
suspended enforcement but declined to amend or repeal its ordinance, contending disposal of 
firearms in police custody is a local matter and, instead, brought suit challenging both SB 1487’s 
procedures and the finding of preemption. In 2017, in State ex rel Brnovich v. City of Tucson,
77
 
the state supreme court sustained the law and the attorney general’s finding. The court rejected 
arguments that by enabling a single legislator to require the attorney general to undertake an 
investigation, and by providing that the attorney general may determine that a local measure 
violates state law with consequent loss of state shared revenue, SB 1487 violated state separation 
of powers principles.
78
 The court criticized the requirement that cities contesting the attorney 
general’s determination must post bond, noting “that requirement, if enforced, would likely 
dissuade if not absolutely deter a city from disputing the Attorney General’s opinion,” which, “in 
turn would displace this Court from its constitutionally  assigned role . . . of interpreting 
                                                          
74
 Further discouraging any effort by a locality to challenge the attorney general’s determination, Arizona also 
makes a local government that loses a lawsuit it brings against the state liable for the state’s attorney’s fees. Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 12-348.01 
75
 See Githush, State Shared Revenue in Arizona: An Assessment. Mar. 13, 2010, 
http://githush.blogspot.com/2010/03/state-shared-revenue-in-arizona.html.  
76
 See Arizona Attorney General, SB 1487 Investigations, https://www.azag.gov/complaints/sb1487-investigations. 
77
 399 P.3d 663 (Az. 2017). 
78
 Id. at 667-71. 
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Arizona’s constitution and laws.”79 But as the state had not sought a bond from Tucson, the court 
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the provision.
80
 On the merits, the court rejected the 
city’s arguments  that it had state constitutional authority as a home rule city to dispose of its 
own property and that its local interest in local public safety was greater than the state’s in 
regulating firearms and police behavior.
81
 Subsequently, the town of Bisbee declined to contest 
the attorney general’s SB 1487 determination that its plastic bag ban was preempted by state law, 
concluding it could not afford to litigate the issue. 
C. Nuclear Preemption.  
As one observer has noted, “the states aren’t merely overruling local laws; they’ve walled 
off whole new realms where local governments are not allowed to govern at all.”82 Legislators in 
several states have raised the idea of completely eliminating local legislative power, either over 
entire fields of regulation or with respect to any subject in which the state has an interest. In 
2016, the Oklahoma legislature considered but did not pass a measure providing that a 
municipality may not act with respect to any subject regulated under state law “unless expressly 
authorized by statute.”83 In 2015, the Texas legislature considered but did not pass measures that 
would have preempted all local regulation of the use of private property, all local authority over 
any activity licensed by the state, and any local law setting higher standards than state law on the 
same subject.
84
 Texas’s Governor Abbott has said that the state should adopt a “ban across the 
board on municipal regulations.”85 And the Florida legislature had before it in 2017 bills, 
reintroduced for 2018, that would expressly prohibit all local regulation of “businesses, 
professions, and occupations,” unless expressly authorized by state law;86 or would prohibit all 
                                                          
79
 Id. at 672. 
80
 Id. A separate opinion, joined by three justices, would have voided the bond provision as “incomplete and 
unintelligible.” Id. at 683. 
81
 Id. at 676-79. 
82
 Badger, Blue Cities Want to Make their Own Rules; Red States Won’t Let Them, N.Y., Times, July 6, 2017., 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/upshot/blue-cities-want-to-make-their-own-rules-red-states-wont-let-
them.html.  
83
 Okla. SB 1289 (2016), https://legiscan.com/OK/text/SB1289/2016.  
84
 See Grassroots Change, Ground Zero: Preemption in Texas, June 18, 2015, 
https://grassrootschange.net/2015/06/ground-zero-preemption-in-texas/. / 
85
 Vock, The End of Local Laws? War on Cities Intensifies in Texas, Governing, April 5, 2017, 
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-texas-abbott-preemption.html.  
86
 Fla H.B. 17 (2017). 
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local regulation of “commerce, trade, and labor.”87 The latter measure included a particularly 
insidious enforcement mechanism under which if one local government believes that another 
locality is violating the restriction it can complain to the state legislature, and if the legislature 
does not “ratify” the challenged local measure by the end of the regular legislative session the 
measure would be considered “nullified and repealed.” Although neither bill has become law, 
Florida’s House Speaker declared himself “certainly a big fan of the concept” of  preempting 
local regulation of business.
88
 
These measures would effectively nuke local power and are an existential threat to local 
self-government. Although continued political support for local autonomy has so far prevented 
the enactment of these far-reaching proposals, the pressure on local governments remain strong. 
With conservative groups even at the local level celebrating the importance of state sovereignty 
and decrying “runaway local governments,”89 such nuclear preemption remains a real possibility. 
III. The Challenge of Defending Local Laws Against State Preemption 
Existing legal doctrines provide local governments with few protections against state 
preemption. Federal constitutional law treats state-local relations as almost entirely a matter for 
the states. State constitutions, despite the widespread adoption of home rule provisions for at 
least some localities, typically allow their states to curtail the regulatory authority of their local 
governments. There are doctrinal tools that could protect local officials and perhaps local 
governments from some penal sanctions, but broader protections will require new legal 
approaches to local autonomy and state-local relations. 
A. Federal Constitutional Arguments 
The United States Constitution does not recognize local governments, and the Supreme 
Court has long treated local governments as essentially subdivisions of their states, no more 
protected from state regulation or displacement than the state’s department of motor vehicles.90 
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 Fla. S.B. 1158 (2017). 
88
 Cotterell, Cities and Counties are playing defense in 2018 session, Tallahassee Democrat, Sept. 16, 2017, 
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 See ACCE White Paper, Federalism, Dillon Rule and Home Rule, Jan. 2016, 
http://www.acce.us/app/uploads/2016/06/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-Dillon-House-Rule-Final.pdf. 
90
 See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 363-64 (2009); Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 
125, 133-34 (2004). 
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In effect, federalism trumps any claim of localism. Local governments have no constitutional 
rights against their states,
91
 and local residents have no federal constitutional claim to the rights, 
powers, boundaries, or even the very existence of their local governments.
92
 To be sure, state 
laws changing local boundaries or stripping local governments of powers can be invalidated if 
they evince an intent to violate the equal protection or due process rights of individuals,
93
 but 
most preemption measures – such as those dealing with environmental or public health 
regulation or employee benefits -- lack such substantive constitutional implications. State laws 
barring local anti-discrimination ordinances present a closer case, but recent preemption 
measures have left in place protections against the kinds of discrimination that the Supreme 
Court has recognized as unconstitutional. Moreover, unlike the sweeping Colorado constitutional 
amendment barring all legal protections for gays and lesbians which the Court struck down in 
Romer v. Evans as motivated by the “bare desire” to harm a group,94 the new anti-discrimination 
preemption statutes have been justified by the non-invidious value of having a uniform statewide 
standard for businesses that operate in more than one locality.
95
   
Some preemption measures have the effect of shifting decision-making authority from 
local governments with African-American or other minority group majorities to a white-
dominated state government. Although the Supreme Court found an equal protection violation 
when a state took away a local power after the locality had exercised it to advance a racial 
minority’s interests,96 when the African-American-majority city of Birmingham raised that 
theory in challenging  Alabama’s preemption of local minimum wage authority in the immediate 
aftermath of Birmingham’s adoption of a minimum wage,97 a federal district court rejected it, 
determining that the preemption law was racially neutral on its face and supported by the value 
of pursuing a “uniform economic policy throughout the state,” and that the plaintiffs failed to 
                                                          
91
 See, e.g., City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Williams v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933).  
92
 See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
93
 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); 
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 Romer, supra, 517 at 634-35. 
95
 See, e.g., Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 510 S.W.3d 258 (Ark. 2017). 
96
 Washington v. Seattle Sch’l Dist., supra. 
97
 Alabama: Law Bans Cities From Setting Minimum Wage, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2016, 
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meet the high standard of proof of intentional discrimination required in the absence of a clear 
racial classification.
98
And, of course, some preemption measures, such as those dealing with 
firearms, can be justified as vindicating federal Second Amendment rights. 
A handful of lower federal courts have suggested local governments have First 
Amendment rights, which might provide a basis for challenging sanctions imposed when local 
governments pass, or decline to repeal, laws that express their views about firearms, 
immigration, or plastic bags.
99
 As Judge Posner put it, “[t]here is at least an argument that the 
marketplace of ideas would be unduly curtailed if municipalities could not freely express 
themselves on matters of public concern.”100 Similarly, in words that have taken on new 
resonance in the aftermath of Citizens United’s validation of corporate speech rights, Judge Jack 
Weinstein determined that “a municipal corporation, like any corporation, is protected under the 
First Amendment in the same manner as an individual.”101 Judge Posner also hinted at a freedom 
of association argument, suggesting that a local government is an association of its residents, “a 
megaphone amplifying voices that might not otherwise be audible,” so that “a curtailment of its 
right to speak might be thought a curtailment of the unquestioned First Amendment rights of 
those residents.”102 These cases, however, involved private challenges to local government 
litigation or lobbying, not local resistance to state restrictions. Moreover, in Ysursa v. Pocatello 
Educ. Ass’n, the Supreme Court rejected the very idea that municipal corporations may be 
assimilated to business corporations for First Amendment purposes.
103
 Restating century-old 
black-letter law, the Court declared that unlike a private corporation, a “political subdivision . . . 
is a subordinate unit of government created by the State to carry out delegated governmental 
                                                          
98
 Lewis v. Bentley, __ F.Supp.3d __ (N.D. Ala. 2017), 2017 WL 432464, at *13. Washington’s “political process” 
theory of discrimination was undermined by Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,134 S.Ct. 1623 
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 See, e.g., Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186, 192 (7
th
 Cir. 1996); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting 
Co., 710 F.Supp. 1387, 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).  Cf. Donaggio v. Arlington Co., 880 F.Supp. 446 (E.D. Va. 1995 (right of 
cities and counties to take positions with respect to pending legislation not clearly protected by the First 
Amendment nor clearly barred by it). 
100
 Creek, supra, 80 F.3d at 192. 
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 County of Suffolk, supra, 710 F.Supp. at 1396. 
102
 Creek, supra, 80 F.3d at 192. See also Bendor, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A New Approach, 31 Yale L. & 
Pol. Rev. 389, 425-26 (2013) (making a similar freedom of association argument for municipal rights). 
103
 555 U.S. 353, 362-64 (2009). 
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functions. A private corporation enjoys constitutional protection . . . but a political subdivision, 
‘created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under 
the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator.’”104 Ysursa 
sustained Idaho’s ability to regulate municipal labor relations and did not involve a measure 
punishing a locality for retaining an invalid law, but in strongly reiterating the “creature of the 
state” model of local government it did not leave much room for the locality-as-association-of-
its-residents theory.
105
 
The First Amendment could provide some protection for local officials. The First 
Amendment does not apply to a legislator’s vote,106 but it does protect the speech of local 
officials, even on preempted issues. As the Supreme Court has observed, “[l]egislators have an 
obligation to take positions on controversial political questions so that their constituents can be 
fully informed by them.”107 In Spallone v. United States, the Court was particularly troubled 
when a federal district court, seeking to remedy a city’s ongoing civil rights violation, imposed 
fines on local legislators who failed to vote for the remedy the district court sought. Noting the 
fines were “designed to cause them to vote, not with a view to the interest of their constituents or 
of the city, but with a view solely to their personal interest” in avoiding paying the fines, the 
Court found that would be a “perversion of the normal legislative process” and was far more 
troublesome than the imposition of sanctions on the city government.
108
 Spallone ultimately 
turned on the  equitable powers of federal district courts rather than the First Amendment per 
se.
109
 Nonetheless, in El Cenizo v. State, the federal district court preliminarily enjoined on First 
Amendment grounds the provision of Texas’s anti-sanctuary law providing for the removal from 
office of local officials who “endorse” sanctuary policies. Moreover, the court enjoined all the 
penalties for “endorsement,” including the civil penalties for local governments.110 This is only 
one decision but it suggests that vague and overbroad language that goes beyond substantive 
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 Id. (citations omitted) 
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 Local government speech may implicate the First Amendment rights of local residents who oppose the 
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preemption and penalizes local expressive activity may trigger a mix of judicially-enforceable 
free speech and due process concerns. 
B. State Law Arguments 
(1) Legislative process and special state constitutional provisions.
111
 Local governments 
are a bit, but only a bit, better off raising state law defenses. Many state constitutions impose 
restrictions on state legislative processes which, while not necessarily aimed at protecting local 
governments per se, can provide a basis for challenging preemptive legislation.  For example, 
many state constitutions require that each bill passed by the legislature address only a single 
subject. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court embraced a single-subject-rule argument in 
invalidating firearm preemption provisions which had been tucked into a bill dealing with the 
theft of “secondary metals” used by utilities and transportation agencies.112 Similarly, the 
Missouri Supreme Court struck down the local minimum wage law that had been tacked on to a 
bill whose “core, original purpose” was the governance and operation of community 
improvement districts.
113
 So, too, many state constitutions prohibit “special acts” that target one 
or a small number of localities for regulation, while exempting others presenting similar 
issues.
114
 These limits on legislative process can provide local governments with protection 
against poorly drafted measures, but, ultimately can be overcome by a determined state 
legislative majority. Other state constitutional provisions provide arguments against particular 
preemptive measures, such as the protection against the punitive removal of county 
commissioners Marcus v. Scott found in the Florida constitutional section regulating the 
suspension of commissioners, or the express authorization for local minimum wage regulation 
that an Arizona court found in a voter-initiated constitutional amendment in that state.
115
 
However, as the Marcus court indicated, these measures may provide only limited protections 
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for their local governments, which grow out of their very specific texts, and may lack broader 
generative force.
116
 
(2) Home rule. At the heart of the local challenge to state preemption is home rule, the 
idea, grounded in the constitutions of the vast majority of  states, that local governments have 
state-constitutionally-protected law-making status.
117
 The problem is that in nearly all states for 
most local regulatory measures, home rule fails to protect against preemption. The states’ laws of 
state-local relations proceed from the same premises as the federal – that local governments are 
creatures of their states, possessing only those powers delegated to them by their states, and 
subject to plenary state authority to alter or abolish their powers, displace their actions, change 
their boundaries, or eliminate them altogether.
118
 State grants of authority to their localities were 
traditionally subject to the judicial canon of interpretation known as  Dillon’s Rule, that is, the 
principle that local governments possess only those powers expressly granted, necessarily 
implied in the express grant, or essential for the accomplishment of their state-prescribed 
purposes.
119
 Starting in the latter part of the nineteenth century, states began to add home rule 
amendments to their constitutions, 
120
 so that today in most states, all municipalities, or at least 
those above some low population threshold, enjoy home rule, and many states have extended 
home rule to their counties, too. 
121
 But home rule has been far more effective in enabling local 
governments to take the initiative and adopt new measures without having to wait for specific or 
express authority from the state – in other words, undoing Dillon’s Rule of limited delegation of 
power – than in protecting those local actions from state displacement.  
The limited effect of home rule is ironic given that the first home rule amendments 
sought to combine initiative with immunity on the theory that if a matter was local enough for 
municipal action it was also local enough to be shielded from state preemption. The Supreme 
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Court referred to St. Louis’s protected status under Missouri’s pioneering constitutional home 
rule amendment as an “imperium in imperio;”122 and the term “imperio” continues to be used to 
describe home rule that combines local initiative with immunity. Imperio home rule, however, 
largely failed to protect local laws from preemption. These amendments typically empowered 
local governments to pass laws concerning “local” or “municipal” matters, but then left the 
meaning of “local” or “municipal” undefined. The scope of home rule became a matter for the 
courts, which often read those terms relatively narrowly. Moreover, with the same language used 
to establish both local initiative and protection from state displacement, narrow judicial readings 
of “local” or “municipal” in preemption cases sometimes led to comparably narrow 
interpretations in initiative cases.
123
 Local and state concerns often overlap, and courts typically 
held that if some state concern was present state law would prevail over an inconsistent local 
law.
124
 In some imperio states, the constitution provides more specific protections for local 
control over certain subjects, most commonly the structure of the local government; the 
relationship between the local government and its workforce; or local-government-owned 
property and public works.
125
 But there is little textual protection from preemption for local 
power to regulate private behavior.  
And that is in the imperio states. Reflecting the perception that the imperio model did not 
provide an adequate basis for local initiative, let alone immunity, in the mid-twentieth century 
home rule proponents developed a new template that protected initiative at the cost of giving up 
on immunity. Under this so-called “legislative” home rule approach, home rule governments 
enjoy all the initiative the state legislature could delegate to them, subject to the power of the 
legislature to deny or take away a power. Today more than half of state home rule amendments 
have embraced the “legislative” model.126 In these states, Dillon’s Rule is still undone, but there 
is no textual protection  from preemption.
127
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123
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To be sure, many state courts read local powers generously and avoid finding preemption 
where there is a plausible argument that the state has not sought to bar local action and that state 
and local laws can coexist.
128
 But where state law clearly articulates an intent to preempt, home 
rule typically provides little protection for local governments.  
A handful of state supreme courts are somewhat more protective of local laws. The 
California Supreme Court has sought to harmonize state and local power by limiting preemption 
to situations where the state law addresses not only a matter of statewide concern but is 
“reasonably related” to the state concern and “narrowly tailored” to avoid unnecessary 
interference with local governance.
129
 However, even in this imperio state local governments 
have been able to prevail against clearly preemptive state laws only in cases involving local 
government political structure and elections,
130
 or local government employment and 
contracts,
131
 and not in cases involving private sector regulation.
132
 The Arizona Supreme Court 
in the Tucson SB 1487 case specifically rejected California’s approach and similar decisions 
from other states that involved an element of state-local balancing.
133
  
Potentially more promising is the Ohio Supreme Court’s requirement that a state law 
preempting local regulation cannot merely block local action but must include some substantive 
replacement regulation.  Ohio, like many states, provides that a local law may be preempted only 
by a “general” state law,134 but whereas most states treat “general” as meaning “broadly 
applicable” or “not narrowly targeting an arbitrarily small subset of local governments,” the Ohio 
courts have held that in the preemption context a “general” law must not only have uniform 
application throughout the state, but must also “prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens 
generally,” that is, it must “set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport 
only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or 
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 See, e.g., Watson v. City of Seattle, 401 P.3d 12 (Wash. 2017); Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 23 N.Y.3ed 728 (N.Y. 
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 See Brnovich, supra, 399 P.3d at 679. 
134
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similar regulations.”135 As a result, Ohio courts have rejected state laws purporting to preempt 
local regulation of foods containing transfats,
136
 local regulation of towing companies,
137
 or 
“local-hire” requirements on certain local construction contracts,138 and burdening local use of 
cameras to enforce traffic laws.
139
 In each case, the state law did not set forth a substantive rule 
of conduct but only regulated municipalities in the exercise of their home rule powers. As the 
appellate court found in upholding Cleveland’s longstanding Fannie Lewis Law, which directs 
that twenty percent of the work hours on large public construction projects be performed by city 
residents,
140
 the 2016 ban on local governments’ local-hire requirements regulated only the 
ability of local governments to set the terms of their public works contracts, and was “no[t] . . . 
directed toward employees or contractors.”141 
Given the powerful deregulatory focus of much of the New Preemption, Ohio’s 
substantive approach to “general law” would be useful to local governments in other states 
fighting state displacement. To date, the doctrine appears to have had no impact outside of 
Ohio,
142
 possibly because its non-intuitive reading of “general law” is quite different from the 
way all other state courts have interpreted that phrase. Nonetheless, the Ohio court is clearly on 
to something. Stripping local governments of regulatory authority over a subject without 
adopting a substantive state rule for that subject is not only a denial of local immunity but 
inconsistent with the local initiative which is at the heart of home rule and with the idea home 
rule embodies that local governments are and ought to be a meaningful part of a state’s 
governance structure. In Part IV, I will suggest that even if other states do not adopt Ohio broad 
reading of “general law” they consider developing similar doctrines that will provide a more 
muscular protection for local action. 
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(3) Protections against punitive preemption. Although with the limited exceptions just 
noted most states provide local governments with little protection from preemption, there are 
state-law arguments for invalidating punitive preemptive measures, particularly civil or criminal 
liability for local officials. The vast majority of state constitutions include a provision, analogous 
to the federal Speech or Debate Clause, immunizing state legislators from suit for their votes, 
statements made in legislative debate, or other actions in connection with their legislative 
work.
143
 These provisions do not by their terms apply to local legislators, but at least one state 
supreme court has so applied it. As the Washington Supreme Court explained, although the state 
constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause “on its face applies only to the state legislature . . . the 
necessity for free and vigorous debate in all legislative bodies is part of the essence of 
representative self-government” and, thus, extends to members of a city council.144 Other state 
courts have held that the common law legislative privilege that predated and inspired the Speech 
or Debate Clause
145
applies to members of local legislative bodies.
146
 This privilege may extend 
to executive branch officials, such as mayors, who participate in the local legislative process or 
to local administrative bodies with executive powers.
147
  
The case for the extension of protection is clear. As the Arizona Supreme Court 
explained, no “good reason [has been] advanced for the proposition that city or town council 
members should be more inhibited in debate than state or federal legislators. Many local law-
makers . . .  legislate on matters of more immediate importance to their electorate than state or 
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federal legislators. Such legislation should be based on all relevant information—both favorable 
and unfavorable—and subjected to the most vigorous debate possible.”148 So, too, a Maryland 
court concluded that the state had conferred upon local legislative bodies “the same 
responsibilities for debating and setting public policy that are vested in legislative bodies 
generally. . . . .The need for legislative integrity and independence is thus as important in the 
local context, for the advantage of the citizens of the local community, as it is at the state 
level.”149 The United States Supreme Court reasoned similarly in holding local legislators 
absolutely immune for their legislative activities from civil rights liability under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. As the Court put it in Bogan v. Scott-Harris, “[r]egardless of the level of government, the 
exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited or distorted by the fear or personal 
liability.”150  
To be sure, these case involved either private suits against local legislators or a 
prosecution in which there was no state law withdrawing common law legislative immunity. 
With the possible exception of the Washington Speech or Debate holding, these decisions turned 
on common law precedents or protective state statutes that could potentially be undone by an 
explicit state punitive preemption law. Nevertheless, they point the way to an argument that a 
respect for local democracy requires that local government officials be protected from 
punishment for their legislative acts. 
The case for protection of local governments from punitive financial penalties, such as 
the loss of state shared revenue in Arizona, large fines, or civil liability to individuals or 
organizations for adhering to preempted laws, is more difficult. Certainly, states may reasonably 
want to tie state funds to compliance with conditions governing use of those funds, and to make 
local governments financially responsible for injuries their violations of state laws cause. 
Nonetheless, many of the new punitive provisions go well beyond protecting the state fisc or 
remedying private losses from local government misconduct and, instead, take advantage of 
limited local resources to bully local governments into submission. The Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of the federal government’s threat in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
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to cut off all Medicaid funding – including funding for pre-existing services -- from states that 
decline to expand their Medicaid programs is a compelling analogy. As the Court determined in 
NFIB v. Sebelius, although “Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for States 
to act in accordance with federal policies,” it could not coerce the states into compliance.151 The 
loss of some federal funding for not participating in a federal program was not impermissibly 
coercive but the cut-off of over ten percent of a state’s overall budget, as the Medicaid expansion 
would have imposed on recalcitrant states, was “a gun to the head” that left the states “with no 
real option to acquiesce.”152 Surely, the threat built into Arizona’s SB 1487 to cut off one-third of 
local revenues is a gun to the head as well. 
To date, only two state courts have considered the NFIB analogy in cases involving a 
threatened cut-off of state funds for localities. In City of El Centro v. Lanier,
153
 a California 
appellate court rejected the argument that a new state law denying state construction funds to any 
charter city that authorized its contractors not to comply with the state’s prevailing wage laws 
was an NFIB-type “gun to the head.” The California Supreme Court had recently held that, as a 
matter of home rule, charter cities could not be required to abide by the state’s prevailing wage 
laws; the new cut-off was plainly an effort to use a financial incentive to circumvent the supreme 
court decision. Although the dissenting judge in El Centro found the funding cut-off law would 
“diminish[] the vigor with which the home rule doctrine protects local prerogatives,”154 the 
majority determined that in the absence of evidence that municipalities were “dependen[t] on 
state funding or financial assistance for municipal projects,” the financial coercion argument 
failed on the facts.
155
 In similar circumstances, after an Ohio trial court found that a state statute 
regulating municipal use of photo-monitoring devices to enforce traffic laws violated the city of 
Toledo’s home rule authority and enjoined the state law’s enforcement, the state legislature 
enacted a budget that reduced payments to local governments that failed to abide by the enjoined 
state photo-monitoring law.
156
 An appellate court found the “city would be required to choose 
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between compliance with the constitutional statute or face a loss of state funding for its 
noncompliance.”157 The court, however, ultimately rested its decision not on home rule concerns 
but on separation of powers -- as an “end-run around the trial court’s injunction,” the state 
budget  unconstitutionally intruded on the prerogatives of the judicial branch.
158
  
These cases point to the seeds of arguments for broader local challenges to some forms of 
state preemption, particular the more punitive and sweeping measures and those that would 
displace local regulations without providing substantive state rules in their place. But these 
arguments point to the different challenge of persuading state courts why they build on these 
theories to defend local initiatives from the more egregious forms of state preemption. That is the 
focus of the next Part. 
IV. The New Preemption and the Legal Status of Local Governments  
The rise of the New Preemption raises anew the place of local government in our system. 
Our governmental structure is in form a two-tier federal one, but in reality a three-tiered federal-
state-local system. This is true normatively, practically, and legally. Many of the values 
associated with federalism are advanced as well, if not better, by local governments. Most of the 
governance functions of the states are actually carried out by a multitude of local governments. 
And the great majority of states, in response to and in support of this considerable local role in 
practice, have provided for home rule in their constitutions or through general enabling 
legislation. Yet, as Part III found, local governments receive no federal constitutional mention, 
and relatively minimal state constitutional defense. This lack of effective legal protection might 
be acceptable in the context of relatively cooperative state-local relations, especially given the 
essential role the states must play in overseeing and managing the state-local system. But at a 
time when “legislatures seem fraught with open hostility in a way they haven’t been in the 
past,”159 the traditional legal laissez-faire approach risks jeopardizing the ability of local 
governments to play their key role in our system.  
The legal status of local governments can be bolstered and local governments provided 
greater protection against state preemption, and that this can be done without falling into the trap 
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set by the imperio model of trying to determining what is “state” and what is “local.” With so 
many public policy arenas combining both state and local concerns, that approach, like its dual 
federalism analogue is bound to fail, as it largely has in nearly all states. Instead, I suggest that 
the empowered local self-government which is at the core of home rule necessarily places some 
limits on state preemption. Laws that punish local officials or governments for exercising their 
home rule powers or that broadly sweep away local law-making over vast areas of local concern 
are fundamentally inconsistent with the idea of home rule. So, too, state measures that displace 
local policies without replacing them with state ones or that unduly constrain local powers 
beyond what is needed to achieve the state’s goals are in deep tension with the value of local 
autonomy enshrined in most state constitutions and many state laws. Such an approach would 
take seriously the mix of values, practices, and laws that make local self-government a 
cornerstone of our political system while also respecting the state’s overarching authority to 
preempt when it sets state-wide policy or addresses the costs local actions impose on non-local 
residents or the state as a whole. 
The case for greater protection for local self-government draws together the normative 
values associated with local self-determination, the significance of its widespread practice, and 
the recognition it has received in state constitutionalism. The values of local autonomy are 
frequently celebrated in our system as they are the values of federalism. As the Supreme Court 
recently reiterated, “the federal structure allows local policies ‘more sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogeneous society,’ permits ‘innovation and experimentation,’ enables greater 
citizen ‘involvement in democratic processes,’ and makes government ‘more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.’ . . .” Federalism secures the freedom of 
the individual. It allows States to respond, through the enactment of positive law, to the initiative 
of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times without having to rely solely 
upon the political processes that control a remote central power.”160 To be sure, notwithstanding 
the reference to “local policies,” the Court was talking about the states. But the Court’s 
federalism cases regularly conflate federalism with the value of “local” self-governance and local 
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governmental accountability to local electorates,
161
 and many of the federalism cases dealt with 
local governments.
162
  The Court’s normative concerns with responsiveness to diverse needs in a 
heterogeneous society, innovation and experimentation, citizen involvement in democratic 
processes, competition for a mobile citizenry apply even more to local governments than 
states.
163
 Ironically, it is the very responsiveness of local governments to citizen engagement, 
their attentiveness to distinctly local preferences and concerns, their use of local regulations to 
compete for a mobile citizenry, and their policy innovations intended to address local problems 
that have provoked the new preemption. As an aspect of state power, the new preemption is 
entirely consistent with federalism per se. But it is in deep tension with the values that the Court 
has invoked to give federalism normative force. 
Local decision-making is not merely honored by judicial rhetoric but is widely practiced 
and has become central to our governmental structure. Most of the subnational governance that 
federalism protects actually occurs at the local level. As the Supreme Court explained in holding 
that local elections are required to comply with the one person, one vote principle, “the States 
universally leave much policy and decisionmaking to their governmental subdivisions. . . . What 
is more, in providing for the governments of their cities, counties, towns, and districts, the States 
characteristically provide for representative government—for decisionmaking at the local level 
by representatives elected by the people. . . . In a word, institutions of local government have 
always been a major aspect of our system, and their responsible and responsive operation is 
today of increasing importance to the quality of life of more and more of our citizens.”164  
Moreover, as the Court has repeatedly pointed out in cases dealing with the local role in 
education, “local control . . . affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decision-making, 
permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages ‘experimentation, 
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innovation, and a healthy competition.’”165 State supreme courts, too, have celebrated the 
importance of “effective local self-government, as an important constituent part of our system of 
government,” particularly when “the nature of those problems varies from county to county and 
city to city.”166 
Thus, such critical public services as public safety and law enforcement, water supply, 
management of waste removal and disposal, public health and hospitals, maintenance of streets 
and roads, housing and community development, and land use regulation are primarily local 
matters. Virtually all fire fighters and the public servants dealing with water supply, solid waste, 
sewage, and housing and community development work for local governments, as do the vast 
majority of police officers and most government workers in the health and hospital sector. 
Indeed, of the 14.5 million state and local employees, nearly 75% work for local governments.
167
 
The key role of local governments, particularly cities and counties run by locally accountable 
elected officials, in policing both underscores their place in our governance structure and points 
toward some of the policies that have drawn preemptive attack. Unlike the states, cities and 
counties can make no claim to being sovereigns, but their central role in policing, including the 
power to make arrests and use deadly force, indicates they regularly exercise some of the 
attributes of sovereignty.
168
 So, too, their special role in maintaining public safety and their daily 
encounters with crime and disorder have made them more attentive to the connections between 
violence and the widespread availability of firearms, as well as the need to work with members 
of immigrant communities – two of the major sources of state-local tension.  
More generally, as both democratically elected governments and service providers that 
regularly have to deal with the street-level problems that create the need for and affect how they 
deliver their services, local governments may feel a greater urgency to act than do the more 
distant state governments. With their major responsibility for public health and hospitals, 
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especially for low income residents, cities and counties may be more aware of the need to 
address the public health costs of gun violence, obesity and food deserts, pesticide use, or lack of 
medical leave – all areas where local responsiveness to local responsibilities have triggered 
conflicts with states. Local responsibility for garbage pick-ups, street cleaning, and parks may 
have heightened city and county awareness of and need to address the costs of 
nonbiodegradeable products like plastic bags and styrofoam, much as their central role in land 
use planning, public health, maintenance of physical infrastructure and public spaces, and 
economic development has led many local governments – even conservative ones169 – to take a 
leadership role through the adoption of smart growth and resiliency initiatives in addressing the 
ostensibly non-local problem of climate change.
170
 The local firefighting role may make local 
governments more interested in mandating sprinklers, just as the local responsibility for stray 
animals may contribute to a concern with puppy mills.  
Local dependence on local resources to pay for local programs
171
 also contributes both to 
the practice of local autonomy and to the policies local governments pursue, often in surprising 
ways.
172
 Expansive anti-discrimination laws, for example, may reflect not simply responsiveness 
to larger urban populations of LGBT residents, but the desire to attract “creative class” residents 
by signaling a city values equality and diversity
173
  so that state preemption “laws make it harder 
for cities to succeed in a global economy that rewards diversity and a liberal approach to 
immigration.”174Moreover, the need to maintain a viable tax base provides local governments 
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with a powerful incentive to carefully balance the costs and benefits of workplace measures that 
could reduce urban poverty but raise the risk of discouraging business. In short, many of the 
seemingly radical measures undertaken by local governments reflect the point made by one 
Madison, Wisconsin council member that “municipal governments are about getting stuff 
done.”175 
Of course, the values of local autonomy are far from uncontested, and the extent of local 
powers is at least formally contingent on state policies that are always subject to change. Local 
autonomy has costs, as local actions can have extra-local effects, and multiple and conflicting 
local rules can burden individuals or firms that are active in multiple localities, to the detriment 
of the state as a whole. Local governments are not always the “good guys.” As the explosion of 
attention to police violence in the aftermath of the deaths of African-American men  in Ferguson, 
Missouri, Staten Island, New York, Baltimore, Maryland and elsewhere indicates, local 
governments can be abusive,
176
 and local responsiveness to local concerns can result in 
exclusionary zoning, segregation, and enhanced inter-local inequality. The scope of local 
autonomy has long been a matter of state law, subject to an ongoing renegotiation of the state-
local relationship. Nonetheless, local autonomy has become more than a matter of political 
values and government practices. It has legal significance due to the widespread state 
constitutional authorization of home rule.  
Home rule grew out of a pre-existing practice of local self-governance,
177
 responded to 
both the expansion of local responsibilities in the late nineteenth century and threats to local 
autonomy in that era,
178
 and provided a firmer legal foundation for local autonomy. As Professor 
Baker and Dean Rodriguez put it, “home rule made concrete, and legally salient, the notion that 
many basic police power functions – including the protection of health, safety, and general 
welfare – were well within the competence of, and even perhaps best effectuated by, municipal 
governments.”179 Indeed, “state constitutions typically contemplate that significant regulatory 
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and administrative power would be exercised by municipal governments”180 – and in some states 
by county governments, too. As Dean Rodriguez has pointed out, this “is a deliberate strategy to 
create opportunities for local governments to employ their ‘local knowledge’ to make innovative 
policy.”181 Local exercise of the police power, including the regulation of private behavior, to 
promote local health, safety, and welfare is of the essence of home rule.
182
 
To be sure, home rule does not create a state-local analogue to federalism. Unlike the 
states in the federal union, local governments are not “indestructible,” but are subject to 
boundary change and abolition. Local governments are not formally represented in the structure 
of state governments. Moreover, states have inherent and plenary law-making authority and local 
governments do not. Yet, in one fundamental sense, federalism and the state-constitutional 
localism reflected by home rule are similar: they operate less by guaranteeing the nominally 
lower level of government immunity from an otherwise constitutional action of the other (with 
some exceptions in imperio states for local control of local government structure and personnel), 
and more by assuring independent law-making capacity for that lower level. In other words, even 
without formal immunity protections from state preemption local home rule matters and local 
initiative is state-constitutionally grounded. Even if a state constitution does not grant local 
governments formal immunity protections, a preemption measure should be held invalid if it 
interferes with the power to act in the first place which is the undisputed purpose of home rule 
and which is essential to local government’s place in our system.  
 This approach to preemption would turn not on whether a matter is “primarily state” or 
“primarily local” -- a question which has long resisted, and is likely to long continue to resist, 
consistent, principled, neutral decision-making – but instead on whether a state law unduly 
impinges on the local capacity for self-governance. It responds, and seems well-suited, to the 
challenge presented by the new preemption’s attack on local regulatory capacity. More 
concretely, it could be applied in the following ways: 
First, and most clearly, it would require the invalidation of punitive preemption, such as 
the firearms and sanctuary city laws making local officials criminally or civilly liable for voting 
for or administering laws subject to preemption. As the state Speech or Debate Clause and 
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common law immunity cases indicate, few actions can have a greater chilling effect on local 
government than threatening local officials with fines or the loss of office simply for supporting 
certain local measures whether or not subject to preemption, or for administering or enforcing 
them before they are held to be preempted. Preemption alone should be enough to vindicate the 
state’s interest, with penalties applied only, if at all, to officials who attempt to enforce local 
laws, notwithstanding judicial determinations of preemption. To say that local legislators expose 
themselves to civil or criminal liability or removal from office for proposing or voting for certain 
measures chills both local self-government and the debate that is appropriate for any subject of 
state-local conflict.
183
 A Palm Beach county official noted that the county had been exploring 
possible gun regulatory measures, but Florida’s statute providing for the removal of officials who 
approved firearms laws, “stopped us in our tracks. . . . Once our jobs were at stake, we dropped 
the plan entirely.”184 Similarly, excessive financial penalties for local governments – like the 
withdrawal of state shared revenue and bond posting requirements of Arizona’s S.B. 1487, or the 
large civil fines for harms notionally resulting from preempted laws -- go beyond protecting state 
policy supremacy and undermine the ability, if not the willingness, of local governments to 
undertake the law-making vouchsafed to them by home rule. As the mayor of Bisbee, Arizona 
pointed out in explaining his town’s decision not to fight the state attorney general’s 
determination that its plastic bag ban was preempted, “[t]he state was ready to pass a death 
sentence on a city over a plastic bag . . . . This is a draconian measure when they can bankrupt 
you. We would have gone belly up."
185
  It is one thing for cities to lose the legal battle over 
whether they have the authority to adopt certain regulations, but it is worse if financial threats 
make them unable to defend their own measures or unwilling even to try to probe the line of 
what is legally permissible for them. To be sure, states should be free to tie funding for specific 
programs to compliance with otherwise legally permissible conditions. But financial penalties 
that go beyond any misuse of earmarked state funds or any actual harm from preempted local 
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conduct penalize local law-making, and that is inconsistent with the local autonomy provided by 
home rule. 
 Second, what I have dubbed “nuclear preemption”—the wholesale denial of local law-
making over broad fields like the regulation of businesses; or commerce, trade, or labor; or any 
field in which the state has also engaged in law-making; or requiring legislative consent for local 
action in these areas – would be subject to invalidation as inconsistent with home rule. These 
proposals would, in effect, eliminate local initiative by either returning enormous areas of local 
concern to the states or reinstating Dillon’s Rule of limited local delegation. They, thus, threaten 
to undo the grant of police power authority at the heart of home rule. It may be difficult to 
determine when a preemptive measure becomes too broad. These are questions of degree that are 
likely to be disputed. But a certainly a preemption measure that makes local action dependent on 
state legislative approval or provides that any area touched by state law – which would likely 
reach every subject in the state – is outside the scope of local legislation would go too far in 
eviscerating. 
 Third, this approach would provide a basis for challenging state laws that create a 
regulatory vacuum by displacing local measures without replacing them with substantive state 
standards or requirement. Such measures are aimed not at determining which level of 
government – state or local – shall control a field, but simply with denying local power to act. 
That is inconsistent with the home rule model of authorizing local action unless inconsistent with 
state policy. This sense that displacement without replacement is less the resolution of competing 
state and local concerns and more unambiguously anti-local underlies the Ohio doctrine that 
preemption laws that do not prescribe a substantive rule of conduct are not “general laws” and 
thus cannot supersede otherwise proper local laws. The problem with the Ohio doctrine is not its 
effect but its rationale. It is not clear why a law that regulates local governments but is general in 
the sense that it applies throughout the state – the traditional meaning of general law – is not a 
general law. But such a law does seem inconsistent with the spirit and practice of home rule, 
even home rule narrowly defined as local initiative without a protection against substantive 
preemption. This approach could, arguably, be end-run by state laws that declare as a matter of 
substantive state policy that a matter or practice should not be regulated at all but left to private 
ordering, although that has apparently not so far been the response of the Ohio legislature to the 
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Ohio courts. But even that would have the value of having the legislature go on record as 
declaring that a subject should not be regulated rather than employing the current subterfuge of 
having legislators say that the matter should be subject to a statewide rule rather than varying 
local ones, but then failing to adopt any such rule. Requiring the legislature to openly embrace 
deregulation rather than merely denigrate local regulation could have political consequences 
favorable to local concerns. 
 Finally, a greater respect for the constitutional commitment to local law-making capacity 
could lead state courts to adopt a version of the California Supreme Court’s requirement that 
preemptive laws be narrowly tailored to the scope of the state’s substantive concern and not 
interfere with local decision-making more than is necessary to achieve the state’s goals.186 
Although labelled by the Arizona Supreme Court as “balancing,”187 this does not involve the 
weighing and comparing of the strengths of the competing substantive state and local concerns 
implied by balancing. It accepts the superior state position but requires states to take the value of 
local decision-making into account and tailor its laws to avoid unnecessary interference with 
local self-governance. The goal here, as with standards for preemption generally, is to be able to 
harmonize the state’s ability to set state-wide policies without unduly constraining local capacity 
for self-governance.  This could lead courts to question, for example, whether the state needs to 
preempt local regulations that impose requirements or restrictions in addition to those set by the 
state. But if a state can demonstrate that limiting local authority is necessary to achieve the 
state’s substantive goals, then the state would still prevail. 
 Admittedly, these four proposals would not constrain the ultimate power of the states to 
preempt local regulations by replacing them with different substantive state laws, but that is a 
design feature of our state-local system. The states must be able address, inter alia. the extra-
local consequences of local actions, the burdens that can result from multiple and divergent local 
rules, and the scale at which economic, social, environmental and other problems are handled. 
But these proposals, grounded in the values, governmental practices, and legal structure of our 
system, would constrain the worst abuses of the new preemption. Beyond that, the scope of local 
autonomy and the resolution of state-local conflicts over the substance of regulatory policies 
would continue to be a matter for state politics. Indeed, historically, local governments, have 
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done relatively well in state legislatures although divisions in large urban delegations may have 
rendered big cities less politically effective.
188
  On the other hand, current patterns of partisan 
polarization, compounded by gerrymandering may have undermined urban political strength at 
the state level, generating a greater need for state constitutional protection.
189
 
V. Conclusion: Local Autonomy – Means or End? 
A particularly salient feature of the new preemption has been the reversal of the 
presumed association of liberals and Democrats with big government and conservatives and 
Republicans with smaller government and local control. As one commentator noted, North 
Carolina’s notorious Bathroom Bill is “a striking example of how North Carolina’s Republicans 
have decided that culture-war issues ought to take precedence over traditional conservative 
preference for local control.”190 So, too, in Texas, the Houston Chronicle remarked “on the 
glaring contradiction of conservative champions of local control seeking to override municipal 
ordinances they don’t like.”191 Indeed, the American City Council Exchange (“ACCE”), the local 
government spin-off from the American Legislative Change (“ALEC”), consists of local officials 
who have championed limits on local power and emphasized local subordination to the states.
192
 
Conservative state legislators have not been shy about asserting that “[w]hen we talk about local 
control we mean state control,”193 and emphasizing that federalism is short-hand way for the 
values of decentralization, but is really only about the states. The Florida legislator who has been 
pushing nuclear preemption in the Sunshine State put it this way: “We are the United States of 
America. We are not the United Towns of Florida. We’re not the United Counties of Florida.”194 
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Dean Heather Gerken has observed that “federalism” (and presumably she would add 
localism) “has no political valence,”195 but  there is a considerable political valence as to who 
supports federalism – or localism – with respect to  a specific issue or at a particular point in 
time. As one Tennessee county commissioner who has had to deal with an aggressively 
preemptive legislature put it, “[p]eople like to talk about local control and they’re all for it unless 
they have a substantive policy preference they care more about and then local control gets 
thrown to the sidelines.”196 So, are the concerns raised by the new preemption, particularly by 
progressives, really about local autonomy or is local autonomy really only a means to the end of 
advancing certain progressive policies? If, as Professor Stahl has argued, “it is unlikely that 
voters and legislators will see the question of local power as anything but a partisan issue,”197 
should these issues – of firearms, workplace equity, discrimination, immigration law 
enforcement, or public health – be argued on substantive policy lines rather than as matters of 
state vs local?  
Certainly, as the bemusement of some commentators concerning progressive localists and 
conservative anti-localists indicates, there is no necessary connection between local autonomy 
and progressive values. Local governments, or at least some of them. have been and continue to 
be associated with a range of non-progressive policies, including anti-immigrant,
198
 anti-
union,
199
 anti-evolution,
200
 anti-medical marijuana,
201
 exclusionary zoning,
202
 and abusive law 
enforcement.
203
 As Judge Barron has pointed out, there was an important conservative strand in 
the late nineteenth/early twentieth century home rule movement that saw home rule as a means 
of limiting the scope of local government action.
204
 So, too, states are not ineluctably 
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conservative. A sharp turn of the political wheel in a half-dozen “purple” states could change the 
“valence” of the preemption issue.205 
Nevertheless, I think there are reasons to support local autonomy apart from the defense 
of “progressive localism.” Without rehearsing all the usual claims for local decision-making, 
including the classics -- protection of liberty,
206
 the economic efficiency that may result from 
interlocal competition,
207
 and the enhanced opportunities for political participation
208
 -- two 
arguments for preserving some space for local autonomy are particularly salient in our current 
period of intense polarization.  
First, local autonomy deals with polarization by devolving policy-making to different 
communities with different populations, conditions, preferences and concerns. Instead of having 
to resolve hotly contested issues involving firearms, immigrants, workplace equity, or even 
plastic bags or sugary drinks on a statewide basis, with the result that large numbers of people on 
the losing side will be aggrieved and subject to rules they oppose (or unable to implement 
policies with broad support in their communities), local autonomy permits different communities 
to have different rules. Polarization of viewpoints is accommodated rather than resolved by the 
contested victory of a narrow statewide majority over the rest. 
Second, local autonomy permits the testing of different ways of addressing disputed 
issues and the development of some real world evidence of how new approaches work in 
practice. Would tighter firearms regulations promote or impair personal security? Do sanctuary 
laws assist or undermine the health, safety and welfare of communities with large numbers of 
immigrants? Do living wage, family leave and predictive scheduling laws burden or benefit the 
local economy? Do plastic bag bans provide real sanitation and environmental improvements or 
are they an unnecessary nanny state burden on consumers? One way to find out the answers to 
these and other questions that are focal points of the new preemption is to let local governments 
try and see the results. Even in an era in which “alternative facts” sometimes are given the same 
weight as real facts, knowledge of how contested regulatory programs work could be useful in 
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lowering the partisan temperature and de-polarizing certain issues. But for this to happen, local 
governments need to be given some space to try new programs. 
To be sure, local autonomy has its limits. Measures that have significant extralocal 
effects, unduly burden intrastate mobility, threaten fundamental rights, or violate constitutional 
norms are necessarily beyond the scope of local action. But local regulations whose effects are 
largely absorbed within the regulating community and don’t implicate fundamental rights or 
constitutional norms should be accepted as within the scope of local decision-making by 
progressives and conservatives alike. Opponents should fight these policies on the merits but not 
by undermining the capacity for local self-government. 
This is surely naïve. Structural values like federalism or localism regularly give way to 
the urgent desire to prevail on the political issue of the moment. But if the rise of the New 
Preemption and the controversy it has aroused has any value it is as a reminder of the importance 
of local governments in our political structure and of the need to protect their opportunities to be 
effective policy-makers.  
